

# An Overview of Fisheries Conflicts in South and Southeast Asia: Recommendations, Challenges and Directions<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract

Fisheries conflicts are among the persistent problems affecting the security of food, livelihoods and fishing environments crucial to poor fishing communities in developing countries in South and Southeast Asia. Most conflicts arise from excessive fishing efforts due to increasing population and economic motivations. Conflicts are not all undesirable as some disputes become a catalyst for much needed reforms for policy and economic improvements. However, a framework for analyzing conflicts in fisheries is necessary to organize interventions relevant to the nature of conflicts, and the needs and capacities of fisheries stakeholders in the region. The WorldFish Center, together with research partners, conducted studies that identify a framework for managing fisheries conflicts. Thematic policy recommendations for managing fishing capacity and related conflicts in small-scale fisheries in the region are identified for further consideration by fisheries stakeholders.


## Introduction

Most fisheries in South and Southeast Asia (SSEA) have been experiencing a biological decline, mainly due to growing fishing pressure. The fisheries are a source of food and income for the growing number of fishing households living at the subsistence level in the region. The fisheries are also under pressure from the commercialization and commoditization of fish in the global market, as well as from other development, industrial and recreational uses of this natural resource and its adjacent environment. The 2004 tsunami that hit the region brought destruction to the already problematic state of fishers' lives and livelihoods, as well as the fisheries and other coastal resources in the region (Pauly 2005). Given all these factors, stakeholders and institutions involved in natural resources management are faced

with serious conflicts. Conflicts are broadly defined as a situation of non-cooperation between parties with contradictory objectives (FAO 1998).

Conflicts in fisheries in SSEA are often viewed in the context of the allocation or access rights to the

limited resources among stakeholders with diverging economic and social motivations. However, they are often far more complex because of the multiple socio-economic factors, such as institutional and market failures, that add to the conflicts (Ahmed et al. 1998; Torell and



Location of study sites in the South and Southeast Asian region.

<sup>1</sup> Updated version of the paper delivered during the Regional Consolidation Workshop of the Fish Fights over Fish Rights project of the WorldFish Center, held at IRRRI, Philippines, 17-20 May 2005. Updates mainly include final project results.

Salamanca 2002). Conflicts arising from gear use, landing site use or market behavior are not primarily about resource allocation. They are rooted in more complex institutional issues such as cultural differences and political power struggles (Bennett et al. 2001). These concerns are among the many broad targets of key international instruments such as the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries of the Food and Agriculture Organization, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, and the formulation of the International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity.

The WorldFish Center initiated two projects to better understand conflicts in fisheries and the associated threats to the sustainability of fishery resources and human survival in selected developing countries in SSEA. The emphasis of the two projects was on the recognition of the importance of documenting conflicts and the identification of options for managing the problems that create these conflicts. This paper provides a summary of selected highlights of the two projects on fisheries conflict management executed by The WorldFish Center in collaboration with research partners situated in areas in SSEA where there are fisheries conflicts. The two projects identified study sites in Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, the Philippines and Thailand. Both projects started in 2003 and were completed in July 2005.

### **Fish Fights over Fish Rights Project**

The project aimed to improve understanding of the dynamics of conflicts arising from excess capacity and to recommend management options for managing fishing capacity and conflicts in small-scale fisheries in the region. Case studies were conducted in eight fishing villages experiencing a range of conflicts. In Cambodia, the three sites included

were: Tamol Leu village in Pursat province representing the small-scale inland fishery in Tonle Sap Lake; Kampong Chhnang village in Kandal province representing the riparian fisheries in the Mekong areas; and Doun Toak village in Kampot province near the west Thai border representing coastal fisheries in the northwest of the Gulf of Thailand. In the vast fishing grounds of the Philippine archipelago, three fishing villages in the municipalities of Concepcion in Iloilo province, Escalante in Negros Occidental province and Daan-Bantayan in Cebu province were selected to represent the many coastal fishers that run in conflict with each other in the Visayan Sea. Finally, Bo Daeng and Na Tub fishing villages in Songkhla province in Thailand were selected to represent the coastal fishing communities where multi-species small-scale fishers have problems with the commercial anchovy fishers.

The WorldFish Center collaborated with the Inland Fisheries Research and Development Institute (IFReDI) of the Department of Fisheries, Cambodia; the University of the Philippines Visayas (UPV), Philippines; the Coastal Resources Institute (CORIN) of the Prince of Songkhla University and the Southern Marine Fisheries Development Center (SMDEC) of the Department of Fisheries, Thailand to implement the project with a research grant from the Ford Foundation. The GTZ provided funds for the conduct of a regional consolidation workshop that was instrumental in bringing together experiences in conflicts and fisheries management and provided a venue for developing methods for resolving these conflicts.

### **Enabling Better Management of Fisheries Conflicts Project**

The Fish Fights over Fish Rights project initiatives were

complemented by this second project. It focused on determining the most appropriate ways of communicating good practice for managing fisheries conflicts, promoting key lessons and practices from earlier projects on conflict and consensus building and, finally, on adapting and demonstrating these practices in study sites where conflicts often disadvantaged poor fishers. The project had a goal of conducting uptake methods for government and NGO workers who are involved in fisheries management. To achieve these adaptive research and communications objectives, seven study sites in freshwater and marine environments in Bangladesh, Cambodia and India were selected. This two-year conflict management project started in July 2003 in collaboration with the Fisheries Action Coalition Team (FACT) in Cambodia, Mitraniketan in India, and the WorldFish Center Regional Office in Bangladesh. The project was funded by the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom (DFID-UK).

## **Framework for Analyzing Conflicts**

### **Theoretical Background**

Why are there conflicts in fisheries? What drives fishers and other stakeholders to conflicts? Charles (1992) provided a framework for analyzing conflicts in fisheries by introducing a trio of fishery paradigms, i.e., conservation, rationalization and social paradigms (Fig. 1). These three paradigms and the policy objective (or development priorities) at which most groups of fishery resource users operate explain why there are conflicts. The three corners of the triangle represent the extreme cases of the three philosophical paradigms and their unique policy objectives. The conservation paradigm operates with a policy objective centered




Figure 1. Framework for understanding and resolving conflicts.

on resource maintenance or conservation. This paradigm is based on the premise that the primary duty of the fishery manager is to take care of the fish, and fishers are viewed as a “predatory fleet” that must be directly managed through restrictive fishing hours, fishing location, fishing effort and catch quota.

The rationalization paradigm emphasizes the pursuit of economic performance and productivity. The policy context related to this paradigm is founded on the assumption that society should seek to maximize fishery rents, comprising economic benefits over and above payments to fishers and vessels; and those fisheries that cannot attain this objective are “supposed to be rationalized”.

The social or community paradigm focuses on fishers as members of coastal communities, rather than as components of a fishing fleet. It focuses on community welfare, distributional equity, and other social and cultural fishery benefits. Charles noted that this paradigm tends to be popular among fishers’ unions, fishing cooperatives and those living in or involved with fishing communities. However, these groups were underrepresented among the staff and management of government

fishery administrations during the time of his research. More recently, there has been an overwhelming interest in this paradigm and the “advocacy” element in this paradigm has contributed to a better understanding of its policy objectives even at the lower levels of the policy-making hierarchy.

Conflicts arise when the many dynamic interactions among natural resources, humans and institutions contradict each other because of the underlying differences in priorities pursued by various fisheries players. Charles (1992) organized the wide range of fisheries conflicts into four interrelated categories: (i) fishery jurisdiction; (ii) management mechanisms; (iii) internal allocation; and (iv) external allocation. These categories were intended to be comprehensive but not mutually exclusive. In a more recent study, Bennett et al. (2001) extended the four conflict categories into five to include conflicts between fishers and those outside the fishery (Table 1).

### The ‘Fish Fights over Fish Rights’ Conceptual Framework

Noting this conflict paradigm in the SSEA fisheries context, Fig. 2 illustrates the conceptual framework

developed and used by the Fish Fights over Fish Rights project and provides the background for the Enabling Better Management of Fisheries Conflicts project. The framework mainly derived from the Driver-Problem-Issue-Intervention analysis that put into context the dynamics of the variables that would potentially address the objectives of the two conflict management studies. This conceptual framework evolved through the analysis of outcomes of case studies and through debates in national and regional stakeholder consultations organized by the Fish Fights over Fish Rights project.

Considering that both studies deal with conflicts associated with scarcity of and competition for fishery resources in the region, the main conflict drivers fall under three categories: (i) policies, institutions for governance and property rights; (ii) population increase and poverty; and (iii) economic incentives/markets and new/improved technology. The state of these variables with reference to the fisheries sector in each country was reviewed in order to identify the circumstances that drive the excess capacity problem in the fisheries sector in the region in general. Fig. 2 also features the local and national security concerns such as fisher’s livelihood, food security, degradation of fishery habitat and stocks, and risk to the lives of enforcers. Finally, the framework presents categories of management and policy interventions that hypothetically offer opportunities for addressing the issues and the excess fishing capacity problem. The options were broadly grouped into three categories: (i) strategies for exit from the fisheries; (ii) review of policies and institutions; and (iii) information, education and communication (IEC).

Among these three groups of interventions, the Fish Fights over Fish Rights project focused




Figure 2. Conceptual framework for addressing excess capacity in small-scale fisheries in Southeast Asia with reference to strategies for exit as interventions that consider conflict management measures.

on determining and evaluating potential strategies for exit from the fisheries. This focus was intended to contribute to efforts to reduce excess fishing pressure and consequently ease conflict resolution or eliminate disputes and threats to security. Meanwhile, the Enabling Better Management of Fisheries Conflicts project focused on the IEC interventions by developing simple communication strategies and tools to guide conflict assessment, negotiations and development of a consensus building attitude among stakeholders. The project also applied other tools such as the Participatory Institutional Survey and Conflict Evaluation Exercise called PISCES (Bennett et al. 2001) and noted the Rapid Appraisal of Fisheries Management Systems developed earlier by ICLARM (Pido et al. 1996).

## Result Highlights

### Conflicts, Typologies and Linkages with Excess Fishing Capacity

Results of these two projects ascertained the existence of a variety

of conflicts associated with declining fishery resources. In all eight case study sites, excess fishing capacity was indicated by modified stocks and catches composed mainly of juveniles and fewer high-value fishes; decreasing quantity and quality of catch; increasing number of fishers and boats; fishers fishing farther away; and emerging conflicts among various resource users. These indicators were parallel to the results of biological assessments that showed exploitation levels of commercial fish species to be beyond the optimum range as most fisheries in the region were harvested up to maximum biological levels (Silvestre et al. 2003).

The conflicts in the study sites were attributed to competition for access/ownership rights, issues of subsistence, economic profits and institutional weaknesses in the small-scale fisheries sector in SSEA. In Cambodia, conflicts in inland fisheries centered on poor governance as demonstrated by the weak implementation of policies, notably the Sub-Decree on Community Fisheries, on the allocation of fishing

lots among commercial interest groups and a growing subsistence populace. Conflicts in coastal marine fisheries were about competition for productive fishing grounds and species targeted by gears used by small-scale fishers and large commercial operators.

Conflicts in the floodplains in Bangladesh had some similarities with those in Cambodia. The diversity of products and livelihood opportunities in the rivers and floodplains in Bangladesh attract many users and stakeholders, but the stagnating inland fishery harvests set the conflict scenario. There has been a dramatic increase in the number of new fishers eking a living from shared resources with traditional fishers. Control of the fisheries, especially by curtailing illegal fishing practices by politically influential users and the weakness of institutions became major causes of disputes.

The conflicts in the Philippines, Thailand and India were similar in terms of disputes between small- and large-scale fishers in capture

Table 1. Fisheries conflicts in study sites in Cambodia, Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh and India.

Typology of Conflicts	Parties involved and specific conflict issue				
	Cambodia	Philippines	Thailand	Bangladesh	India
<b>Type I</b> Who controls the fishery (access issues)	Community fishers vs. large fishing lot owners and medium-scale fishers over access rights on designated zones by type of fishery	Small-scale fishers vs. commercial fishers and fishery regulatory bodies over zoning of fishing grounds to delineate access by category of fishers	Large vs. small-scale fishers over rights and access to designated zones by type of fishery and use of light luring and modern fishing gears by large-scale fishers	Traditional fishers vs. <i>katha</i> (brush fish aggregating device) owners over fishing access  Conflict due to <i>pseudo-property</i> (due to residency /ancestral) rights among small-scale fishers	Traditional vs. mechanized fishers who venture in 8 km inshore waters allocated for traditional fishers
<b>Type II</b> How are the fisheries controlled	Community and medium-scale fishers vs. large fishing lot owners, on over-enforcement of rules by lot owners who utilize military force  Fishers vs. fisheries officials, local authorities, illegal fishers over poor governance (weak action on illegal fishing, sale of public fishing areas, etc.)	Small-scale fishers vs. commercial fishers and sea patrols over variable levels of patrolling and enforcement of the latter that favor commercial fishers who can afford penalties	Commercial trawlers, push netters vs. regulatory agencies over lack of enforcement to control the number of fishing vessels and limit entry and operation of destructive gears	Legal fishers vs. illegal gear operators over lack of enforcement on use of illegal gears	Fishers vs. state government on mesh size regulation
<b>Type III</b> Relations between the fishery users (linguistic, religion, ethnic, scale of fishing)	Rivalry between ethnic groups  Community fishers vs. outsider illegal fishers on poaching inside community fishing areas	Local artisanal vs. migrant commercial fishermen over access and competition on fishing zones	Rivalry between resident small-scale vs. migrant large-scale anchovy fishers over legitimacy of access and destruction of gears	Traditional and new fishers compete for riverine resources  Fishers vs. Beel Management Committee (BMC)	Traditional fishers complain over use of ring seines by mechanized fishers
<b>Type IV</b> Relations between fishers and other users of the aquatic environment (fishing vs. tourism and similar water resource-based industries)	Lowland farmers vs. fishers over access and use of water and inundated forest	Fishery and sectors such as tourism, navigation/ docking, sand quarrying and mariculture over varying use of aquatic resources	Rice farmers vs. prawn breeders over resource use	None reported in case study area	Traditional vs. mechanized fishers and hatchery operators over collection of prawn brooders  Fishers vs. government and industries on discharge of effluents; also tourism
<b>Type V</b> Relationship between fishers and non-fishery issues	Fishers vs. law enforcement authorities over lack of proper management and poor enforcement due to weak institutional structures	Fishers vs. government authorities over variable standards in management and enforcement arising from devolution of functions and overlapping institutional structures	Fishers vs. government authorities over lack of proper management and enforcement	Conflicts due to overlapping of functions and weak institutional structure at various levels	Fishers vs. government on overlapping functions of agencies and weak structure at various government levels

marine fisheries. In the Visayan Sea in the Philippines, these conflicts had worsened due to the national fisheries policy, known as the 1998 Fisheries Code, which excluded large-scale fleets from fishing zones within 15 km from the shoreline. Large-scale fishers contested the government on the fairness of the regulation, while small-scale fishers protested against the poor implementation of such regulations as evidenced by the unchecked intrusion of large-scale fishers in near-shore waters. This legitimacy of access issues bred other forms of disputes, from fishing gear entanglements (where active gears destroys passive fixed gears of the small-scale fishers), to threats to the lives of village-level volunteer coast guards arising from altercations with large-scale illegal gear operators.

At the Gulf of Songkhla in Southern Thailand, fishing zones had been demarcated for all gears under the National Committee for Fisheries Policy by the Department of Fisheries. The policy was intended to address problems of overcapacity and avert potential conflicts between commercial anchovy fishers and operators of other small-scale gears. The anchovy fishing operators, however, contended that their way of fishing was not detrimental to the resource and livelihoods of small-scale fishers and challenged the government-imposed ban on gears they used.

In India, the main conflicts in the study areas arose from competition for access to the shared fishery resources, in particular, the encroachment of mechanized boats in the area within 8 km from the shore allocated for traditional fishers. Other disputes were due to use of small mesh nets, trawling in breeding grounds and weak market structure. Conflicts also arose over the pollution caused by

effluent discharges and oil spills from various industries. Tourism was also noted as a cause of conflict between promoters and traditional fishers.

Table 1 gives a summary of conflicts divided into five categories: (i) rights and access; (ii) enforcement of regulations; (iii) fishery group-related disputes; (iv) non-fishery use of fishery resources; and (v) non-fishery concerns affecting the fishery. Conflicts were categorized according to these five typologies to find patterns/relationships between typologies and corresponding management/policy options. Such patterns, if they exist, can facilitate the formulation of conclusions and recommendations.

### Security Threats Arising from Fisheries Conflicts

In the Fish Fights over Fish Rights project, further evaluation of conflicts observed in the case study sites showed some pattern of relationship between conflict type and the nature of threats that could potentially arise from such conflicts (Salayo et al. 2006). Type I conflicts (Fig. 3) tended to create threats to the overall health of the fishery resources. The stakeholders believed that if Type I conflicts were not addressed, the “non-owners” or outsiders who gain access to the fishery would conduct illegal and “harmful” practices to obtain maximum benefits at intensive exploitation levels. In addition, food security was threatened by fishing rights being sold to other ‘outsider’ fishers. Type II conflicts included those that manifest themselves due to lack of enforcement and implementation of regulations. The lack of clarity and purpose of regulations was listed as reason for violations and conflicts. For example, the establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs) as conservation measure is a trend in the Philippines. However, the lack information on the purpose



Anchovy fishing boat operating in the Gulf of Songkhla, Southern Thailand.



Interview with fishers in the Visayan Sea, Philippines, July 2004.



The Anlong Raing floating village in Tonle Sap, Cambodia is home to many fishers relying on implementation of the Sub-Decree on Community Fisheries.



Coastal area in Andhra Pradesh India where traditional and mechanized fishers and their families compete for marine resources.




Figure 3. Patterns of relationship between conflict type and nature of threats arising from such conflicts.

for those affected created conflicts, as MPAs restricted access and limited fishing areas for most fishers. The fishers perceived it as a threat to their livelihoods and food security.

Type III conflicts especially those between fishers using basic gears and other fishers using more efficient but illegal and destructive gears, can result in degradation of fishery habitat and stocks and consequently loss of livelihood and subsistence. Similarly, Type IV conflicts may also ruin the environment. Type V conflicts occur when non-fishery issues that do not directly use fishery resources nevertheless affect the fishery significantly. Such conflicts have been reported in Cambodia and the Philippines, where fishers had disputes with law enforcers, including government fishery officers. Apart from fomenting disrespect for the law and the law-makers and enforcers among fishing communities, such conflicts also result in more serious ramifications such as a politicization of policies related to fisheries and fishing communities and a lack of political determination. Both these

phenomena were perceived to be detrimental, especially to the livelihoods of ‘unfavored’ fisher groups, as the destructive/illegal fishing operations of many of the politically favored groups were perceived as threats to the survival of the fishery.

### Challenges and Directions

The two projects on conflicts in capture fisheries in inland and marine environments indicate that conflict management should be embedded in natural resource management. In particular, options for managing excess fishing capacity should involve measures for understanding and managing conflicts and the associated threats.

In recognition of the challenges, the sector is expected to persist on its important and immediate goals of, among others: (i) protection of fishery resources and conservation of fishery habitats; and (ii) development through provision of sustainable livelihoods to marginalized groups in the fishery sector. To achieve

these goals, providing specific action plans to the policy and management interventions proposed in this paper are viewed as the challenges and directions that may pave the way for obtaining positive outcomes from conflicts and for elimination and resolution of negative conflicts.

### Strategic Exit from the Fisheries: A Way for Managing Excess Capacity

This is a sensitive issue of survival of the poor and marginalized fishers. Large-scale commercial fishers find it difficult to exit as capital investment in fisheries is not easily transferable to other income-generating opportunities. A creation of awareness through information and communication strategies could establish the credibility of benefits arising from exit strategies. The creation of sustainable alternative livelihoods is a challenge in resource-depleted and capital-deprived environments. Furthermore, the capacity to shift to other skills and work-styles is often limited among fishers. Aquaculture is often perceived as an alternative for reducing capacity and fishing pressure while making fish available to the growing populations. However, aquaculture development has unintended negative impacts on various sectors when not applied responsibly.

### Review of Policies and Institutions

The basic laws and regulations for managing fisheries are already in place in the countries included in this study. However, conflicts are prevalent because of the poor implementation and enforcement of most fishery laws and regulations. Thus, it is necessary to involve all stakeholders in the fishery and related sectors as well as the policy makers and fisheries managers in a thorough and periodic review of policies and institutions. Participatory management,

governance at various levels and assignment of property rights are key issues that remain a challenge for managing excess capacity and conflicts in fisheries. Policies are typically developed at the national level, with devolution of functions and co-management at the community and municipality level. However, in between these levels of governance, some efforts are dissipated (due to poor implementation mechanisms) and would need further studies and collaboration.

### **Information, Education and Communication (IEC)**

Creating awareness of and promoting best practices for managing the fisheries, including mechanisms for consensus building in cases of conflicts, are priority areas in a comprehensive strategy for managing conflicts and exit in an overexploited fishery. Innovations in IEC methods are required to further the goals of environmental security and sustainability of the fisheries as these involve a more complicated inter-temporal and spatial dimension. For example, our empirical results showed that various types of conflicts arising from excess capacity have long-term implications for fishing livelihoods, food security, habitat and fish stocks. How do IEC methods ensure that environmental security, including fisheries, would be recognized as a non-traditional security concern in the midst of real life circumstances where the rule of the state and use of military remain “visible” in the management and exploitation of the fishery, as largely reported in Cambodia’s fishing lot system?

In this context the challenge is to successfully involve the stakeholders and duty-holders in the chosen management options and ensure their sustained participation. Furthermore, when participation

is hampered by diverging concerns, what are the mechanisms suitable for eliciting consensus and conflict resolution? Tools in conflict management such as consensus building are instruments that could be extended or modified to incorporate securitization in non-traditional context (Salayo et al. 2006). ‘Interactive governance’ is defined as a process that comprises all of the interactions among stakeholders involved in addressing problems and creating opportunities. It must allow for pooling of specialized competencies and also for mutual interactive learning throughout the decision making process. However, to be accepted by all stakeholders and to be effective, governance needs to be transparent, equitable, legitimate and consistent (MARE undated brochure). In some countries in SSEA, interactive governance has taken place through the devolution of power for the management of the fishery to local government units and fishery agencies.

There is a need for additional work to address cross-border fisheries conflicts and security issues across the globe. These issues are beyond the scope of the current study, yet relevant for another phase with a global and cross-country scope. Therefore, during the Regional Consolidation Workshop held from 17-20 May 2005 in the Philippines, it was decided to draft a follow-up collaborative project.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

The two WorldFish conflict management projects demonstrated that conflicts due to excess fishing capacity in the small-scale sector cut across the social and biological dimensions of managing the fisheries. This complexity reinforces the challenge for all stakeholders to

develop the necessary management and policy interventions. The Fish Fights over Fish Rights project identified the following thematic policy recommendations for managing fishing capacity and related conflicts in small-scale fisheries in the region:

#### **Institutional partnership in research and development.**

The academe and the government are encouraged to collaboratively undertake relevant research and development (R&D) programs; provide scientific/technical advice and other relevant information; and enhance institutional networking.

#### **Building non-fishery human capacity to reduce fishing capacity.**

The government and NGOs are admonished to build capacity of institutions at all levels of governance; develop coordination and partnership among stakeholders; facilitate community organizations and development; act as key partners in sustainable resource management; participate actively in action programs at the local level; and secure access to resources for sustainable livelihood.

#### **Promote and harmonize action plans through good governance.**

Fishery agencies should formulate and implement a national plan of action for addressing over-capacity and resource use conflicts in fisheries; harmonize relevant plans of action at the international/regional levels; and promote collaboration in implementing international/regional action programs.

#### **Advocate management interventions and politicize security threats.**

All groups of stakeholders, from fishers to policy-makers and academicians, are encouraged to promote a conducive policy climate; promote effective natural resource management; and support fisheries and resource management.



The above policy recommendations are indicative of the need for an integrated approach to address overcapacity and fisheries conflicts. Some solutions to conflicts arising from overcapacity are beyond the fisheries sector. Thus, under each policy recommendation are detailed action plans for managing fishing capacity and exit of some fishers from the fisheries. These have to be adopted and implemented – singly or collectively – by various stakeholders. However, partnerships and collective efforts are preferred and encouraged to ensure comprehensiveness and multi-lateral understanding, and acceptability of measures for managing fishery resources and resolving conflicts. These policy recommendations evolved from the case studies and national/regional multi-stakeholder workshops attended by fishery stakeholders in the region.

Meanwhile, the Enabling Better Management of Conflicts project produced IEC materials for the implementation of planned strategies for managing fisheries conflicts. One such output is a

Fisheries Conflicts Communication Framework (FishCom) composed of tools for evaluating and managing conflicts. Another output is an adaptation called the Participatory Action Plan Development (PAPD)-Based Consensus Building Tool: A Facilitator's Guide, an outcome of collaboration on consensus building exercises with the Center for Natural Resources Studies (CNRS) in Bangladesh and a trial in India. The third is a draft Policy Brief on Managing Fisheries Conflicts: Communication and Consensus Building in South and Southeast Asia. These IEC materials are intended for policymakers, conflict management practitioners and other stakeholders in the field who could be part of the conflict management process.

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