Enforcement and compliance with fisheries regulations in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines
- A study of compliance with fisheries regulations in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines is presented. Compliance models which account for moral obligation and social influence in addition to the conventional expected costs and revenues associated with illegal behavior are developed and tested. The basic deterrence model of regulatory compliance, which focuses on the certainty and severity of sanctions as key determinants of compliance, yields only a partial explanation of compliance behavior and provides poor guidance for policy. To offer a more complete explanation, the models tested herein integrate economic theory with theories from psychology and sociology to account for both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations influencing individuals' decisions whether to comply. Probit, Logit and Tobit econometric estimators are used to examine the compliance behavior of 792 Malaysian, Indonesian and Philippines fishers. The findings are used to draw implications for compliance policy in the context of fishery management regulations.