Productivity, capital mobilization and moral hazard in fisheries share contracts: Lake Nasser, Egypt
| cg.contribution.worldfishauthor | Finegold, C. | en_US |
| cg.contribution.worldfishauthor | Bene, C. | en_US |
| cg.contributor.affiliation | WorldFish | en_US |
| cg.contributor.affiliation | WorldFish | en_US |
| cg.contributor.affiliation | Lake Nasser Development Authority | en_US |
| cg.coverage.country | Egypt | en_US |
| cg.coverage.region | Northern Africa | en_US |
| cg.description.theme | Aquaculture | en_US |
| cg.identifier.status | Open access | en_US |
| cg.identifier.worldfish | 4805 | |
| cg.subject.agrovoc | lake fisheries | en_US |
| cg.subject.agrovoc | contracts | en_US |
| cg.subject.agrovoc | risk management | en_US |
| dc.creator | Finegold, C. | en_US |
| dc.creator | Bene, C. | en_US |
| dc.creator | Shehata, M. | en_US |
| dc.creator | Habib, O.A. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-07T12:50:56Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-08-07T12:50:56Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | As part of an international research project on reservoir fisheries productivity in developing countries, this paper examines contractual relations in the Lake Nasser fishery, seeking to understand why so many seemingly redundant contract types coexist and what effect they have on productivity. | en_US |
| dc.description.version | Peer Review | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Social and Development Sciences, 1(5): 183-193 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.22610/jsds.v1i5.643 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2221-1152 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12348/4294 | |
| dc.language | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | AMH International | en_US |
| dc.title | Productivity, capital mobilization and moral hazard in fisheries share contracts: Lake Nasser, Egypt | en_US |
| dc.type | Journal Article | en_US |