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dc.creatorFinegold, C.en_US
dc.creatorBéné, C.en_US
dc.creatorShehata, M.en_US
dc.creatorHabib, O.A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-07T12:50:56Z
dc.date.available2020-08-07T12:50:56Z
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Social and Development Sciences, 1(5): 183-193en_US
dc.identifier.issn2221-1152en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12348/4294
dc.description.abstractAs part of an international research project on reservoir fisheries productivity in developing countries, this paper examines contractual relations in the Lake Nasser fishery, seeking to understand why so many seemingly redundant contract types coexist and what effect they have on productivity.en_US
dc.languageenen_US
dc.publisherAMH Internationalen_US
dc.titleProductivity, capital mobilization and moral hazard in fisheries share contracts: Lake Nasser, Egypten_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionPeer Review
cg.coverage.countryEgypten_US
cg.coverage.regionNorth Africaen_US
cg.identifier.worldfish4805
cg.subject.agrovoclake fisheriesen_US
cg.subject.agrovoccontractsen_US
cg.subject.agrovocrisk managementen_US
cg.contributor.affiliationWorldFishen_US
cg.contributor.affiliationWorldFishen_US
cg.contributor.affiliationLake Nasser Development Authorityen_US
cg.identifier.statusOpen accessen_US
cg.contribution.worldfishauthorFinegold, C.en_US
cg.contribution.worldfishauthorBéné, C.en_US
cg.description.themeResilient small-scale fisheriesen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.22610/jsds.v1i5.643en_US


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